Supreme Court Adopts Broad Reading of Key Terms of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act

On Thursday May 21, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court (the “Court”) ruled in favor of Havana Docks Corporation in Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, a suit in which Havana Docks is seeking compensation under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act (“Title III”) for property seized by the Cuban Government.[1] Havana Docks had a concession from the Cuban Government originating in 1928 to develop and operate a large terminal building and three piers (collectively referred to as the “docks”) in Havana through 2004. In 1960, however, the Cuban Government seized control of the docks and confiscated Havana Docks’ assets without compensation. In 1996, Congress enacted Title III of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996 to make any entity that “traffics” in confiscated property liable to any U.S. national who owns a claim to that property.[2]

The Court’s opinion announced two key holdings. First, the Court held that for purposes of Title III, although Havana Docks’ concession was time-limited and by its terms was to have expired in 2004, the phrase, “property which was confiscated,” can refer to the physical docks in which Havana Docks had an interest when Cuba seized control in 1960, not only to the concession itself. In other words, the Helms-Burton Act does not demand absolute correspondence between the property confiscated and the property interest of the party seeking to bring suit. Second, the Court held that a cruise ship’s commercial use of a dock satisfies key elements of the definition of “trafficking” in the dock for purposes of Title III. Therefore, even though Havana Docks’ concession with respect to the docks expired in 2004, the Court held that Title III grants Havana Docks a cause of action against the four commercial cruise lines that “trafficked” in (i.e., used) the dock between 2016 and 2019, a period in which the four cruise lines transported nearly one million passengers to Cuba using the docks to embark and disembark their passengers.

Background

In 1928, the Cuban Government granted Havana Docks a concession[3] to develop and operate the docks at the Port of Havana. The concession was set to expire in 2004, and the docks were owned by the Cuban Government. In 1960, Fidel Castro’s Government seized the docks and confiscated Havana Docks’ assets without compensation.[4]

Congress enacted Title III of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996 to provide American victims of confiscation by the Cuban Government with a judicial remedy in U.S. courts. Title III states that any entity that “traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property.”[5]

Havana Docks, a U.S. business, brought this suit to recover against four commercial cruise lines that used the docks to transport paid passengers to Cuba from 2016 to 2019.[6] The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida awarded Havana Docks more than $100 million from each of the cruise lines, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) reversed. The Court of Appeals analyzed the claims by asking whether the alleged trafficking by the cruise lines would have interfered with a property interest of Havana Docks at the time the alleged trafficking occurred, if the Cuban Government had never confiscated Havana Docks’ assets. The Court of Appeals ruled that Havana Docks could not recover compensation from the cruise lines because Havana Docks’ concession interest, by its terms, would have expired in 2004, and the cruise lines used the docks after that date. 

Supreme Court’s Decision

In an 8-1 opinion, the Court adopted a broader reading of the statute than the Court of Appeals, and ruled in favor of Havana Docks. It first considered whether the phrase “property which was confiscated” required Havana Docks to prove trafficking in its concession or allowed it to rely on trafficking in the physical docks. Relying on the plain text’s ordinary meaning, the Court concluded that “‘property which was confiscated’ can be the physical property in which the plaintiff had an interest,” and not just the property interest (i.e., the concession) itself.[7] The docks underpinning Havana Docks’s concession thus constitute “property which was confiscated,” and Havana Docks’ Title III claim was not defeated by the fact that its concession would have expired in 2004.

Second, the Court evaluated whether the cruise lines’ activities with respect to the docks between 2016 and 2019 constituted “trafficking” for purposes of the statute. The statutory definition of “traffics” includes instances where an entity “uses” or “engages in commercial activity using” confiscated property.[8] The Court explained, “[i]t is undisputed that when [the cruise lines] transported nearly a million paying passengers to Cuba, the cruise lines ‘used the docks.’”[9]

For these reasons, the Court concluded that the cruise lines used confiscated property to which Havana Docks holds a claim. The Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider defendants’ additional arguments with respect to their liability.

Concurrence

Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kavanaugh, identified two practical issues that the Court did not reach and that may be significant on remand or in future Title III cases.

First, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion cautioned against reading Title III to authorize plaintiffs to recover the full value of statutorily authorized damages from multiple defendants. Discussing Havana Docks’ arguments before the District Court, her opinion noted that Havana Docks’ logic would authorize it to recover “$110 million from every person who uses the docks in any way.”[10] Her opinion reasoned that it “is unlikely that Congress intended for someone who suffered a finite loss to reap infinite recoveries.”[11]

Second, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion questions whether the cruise lines’ conduct may have been excepted from liability given a provision in Title III that excludes “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba.”[12] Her opinion notes several official U.S. government statements indicating that the cruise line’s activities may have been permissible, including: an announcement by President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro at a joint press conference that the United States Government had “removed the last major hurdle to resuming cruises and ferry service”; statements by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control indicating that such services did not violate U.S. sanctions; and representations from the U.S. Department of State that it would not bring enforcement actions for the contemplated activities.[13] Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence further reasons that if defendants received assurances from government officials regarding the lawful nature of their activities, holding them liable for that conduct could raise due process concerns.

Dissent

As the sole dissenter, Justice Kagan would have treated the concession as the only property confiscated from Havana Docks and would have held that the cruise lines did not traffic in that concession after it would have expired in 2004. Justice Kagan would have limited the right to compensation to the property interest alone, and not the underlying property to which the concession related. As she viewed the property interest (i.e., the concession) to have been extinguished prior to defendants’ use of the docks, under Justice Kagan’s reading of Title III, Havana Docks lost an enforceable right against future traffickers after the concession’s scheduled expiration in 2004.

Justice Kagan also questioned whether the Cuban Government ever confiscated the property: given that Havana Docks’s interest arose from a time-bound concession, and Cuba retained ownership of the physical property. Her dissent reasons that Cuba’s seizure of the docks was a merely premature confiscation of the concession, not confiscation of the docks. Justice Kagan therefore would have affirmed the Court of Appeals and denied Title III recovery.

Implications

The Court’s reading of Title III provides broader avenues to recovery for certain U.S. nationals whose property interests in Cuba were subject to confiscation by the Cuban Government. The decision may broaden Title III exposure where companies have used, or engaged in commercial activity using, physical property previously seized by the Cuban Government, even if the claimant's original time-limited property interest would have expired by the time of such use. In this way, the Court’s decision has the potential to increase business risks associated with doing business in Cuba at a time when the Trump Administration is increasing pressure on the Cuban regime through sanctions and other measures.

When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, it also granted certiorari over a separate case regarding the Helms-Burton Act. That case, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporacion CIMEX, S.A., No. 24-699, concerns whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether plaintiffs must separately satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The Court heard oral argument on February 23, 2026.

S&C is monitoring these developments and is available should you have questions regarding these matters.