Summary
On June 17, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “Department”) announced the National Security Division’s (“NSD”) first declination under the DOJ’s revised Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”). The NSD declined to prosecute Robert Bosch GmbH (“Bosch”) for potential violations of the Export Control Reform Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4819 (the “ECRA”). According to the declination letter, two Bosch subsidiaries allegedly exported certain foreign-produced sensor products and software to Huawei Technologies Co., a sanctioned Chinese company, in violation of the ECRA. Consistent with DOJ’s revised Department-wide CEP, announced in March 2026 and described in a prior S&C client memo, Bosch earned a declination because the company successfully: (i) conducted an internal investigation, (ii) voluntarily self-disclosed the matter while still investigating, and (iii) promptly and appropriately remediated. Bosch further agreed to pay approximately $11.4 million in disgorgement. Bosch also entered into a parallel civil agreement with the Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (“BIS”).
This is NSD’s first declination under the new CEP and the Department’s second, following the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section’s March 19, 2026 declination regarding Balt SAS, a medical device company based in France. The Bosch declination confirms the Department-wide scope of the revised CEP and demonstrates potential benefits under the CEP for companies that voluntarily self-disclose, investigate, cooperate, and remediate.
Key Aspects of the Declination
Background
Bosch is an international technology and services company headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. According to the declination letter, the Department found evidence that, between September 2020 and September 2024, two non-U.S. subsidiaries of Bosch, Bosch Sensortec GmbH (“BST”) and ETAS GmbH (“ETAS”), engaged in potential violations of the ECRA and related regulations. Specifically, BST and ETAS allegedly re-exported to Chinese company Huawei and its affiliates over $70 million worth of certain foreign-produced sensors and software, without obtaining the required licenses or authorization from BIS. According to the declination and parallel agreement with BIS, during most of the relevant period, Bosch’s U.S.-based export controls compliance team “primarily consisted of two employees” who lacked “sufficient expertise or resources” and were “ill-equipped to provide accurate guidance” on the issues, resulting in potential export violations.
CEP Factors
Bosch eventually discovered the potential violations and, according to the declination letter, took the following steps consistent with the CEP:
Internal Investigation. Bosch conducted a robust internal investigation. That investigation revealed that Bosch had not obtained the necessary authorizations from BIS to export these products to Huawei. It further revealed that Bosch’s trade compliance personnel were not adequately trained to provide proper guidance, and that sales in violation of the law and regulations were ongoing. The investigation did not reveal evidence that Bosch’s mistakes were the result of willful conduct.
Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Cooperation. Bosch timely and voluntarily disclosed the conduct and cooperated with DOJ. It disclosed relevant facts in the first instance, and made prompt and voluntary responses to further requests.
Prompt Remediation. As a result of its internal investigation, Bosch made certain organizational changes, added 66 employees to its trade compliance organization, expanded its resources on U.S. trade compliance, and updated relevant internal policies.
Along with these factors, Bosch also agreed to disgorge the $11.4 million in pre-tax profits it earned from sales to Huawei through BST and ETAS of products for which Bosch failed to obtain proper permission.
Implications
First, the Bosch declination confirms the Department-wide scope of the revised CEP because it marks the second DOJ component, after the Fraud Section’s Balt declination, to apply the Department-wide CEP in issuing a declination instead of the component’s own policy. Previously, the NSD applied its own “Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations,” in evaluating whether to decline prosecution. In issuing the CEP, the Department explained its intention that the CEP would supersede “all component-specific or U.S. Attorney’s Office-specific corporate enforcement policies currently in effect.” The Bosch declination underscores the Department’s stated commitment in adopting the CEP to consistency, transparency, and predictability in corporate criminal enforcement across the Department’s components. Questions may remain, however, about whether or to what extent the CEP supersedes the voluntary self-disclosure policy announced in February 2026 by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. That policy offers entities accused of corporate fraud a clear route to a speedy conditional declination, an option not mentioned in the CEP.
Second, the Bosch declination demonstrates real benefits for companies that commit to early and voluntary self-disclosure, and full cooperation and remediation. Here, for instance, Bosch complied with CEP requirements by voluntarily self-disclosing the conduct, fully cooperating with the Department’s investigation, and timely and appropriately remediating the misconduct.
The Bosch declination may encourage similarly-situated companies facing investigations across different Department components to voluntarily and promptly disclose potential misconduct to the Department, and fully cooperate and remediate in seeking a declination under the CEP.