Although predicting electoral outcomes can be difficult, recent polling and historical trends suggest that Democrats could potentially take control of the U.S. House of Representatives and even possibly gain a narrow majority in the U.S. Senate following this year’s midterm elections.[1] If either of these occurs, we would expect the 120th Congress to have different oversight and investigative priorities than its predecessor. Historically, in times of divided government, Congress has typically relied on its investigative powers,[2] as “divided government ma[kes] it more difficult for Congress to pass legislation, spurring members to focus on investigations and oversight.”[3] Although much of this oversight would focus on the operations of the Executive Branch, we would expect that both privately held and publicly traded companies could be the subject of congressional inquiry.
In light of the public nature of congressional hearings, which bring unique risks and challenges for those under investigation, companies potentially facing such scrutiny should begin preparing well in advance of January 2027, including by evaluating any potential risks they may face, the scope of congressional subpoenas and other investigative tools, and Congress’s enforcement authority. This memorandum provides an overview of Congress’s subpoena authority and addresses potential investigative priorities for the 120th Congress should Democrats gain the majority.
This is the first in an ongoing series of client updates on congressional investigations.
Although “Congress has no enumerated constitutional power to conduct investigations or issue subpoenas,” courts have consistently held that “each House has power ‘to secure needed information’ in order to legislate.”[4] This broad power to investigate[5] has been deemed “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function”[6] because “Congress cannot intelligently legislate without identifying national problems in need of legislative solution and relying on testimony and data that provide a deeper understanding of those problems, their origins, and potential solutions.”[7] Congress may pursue any investigation that “serve[s] a ‘valid legislative purpose.’”[8]
Most congressional investigations commence with committee requests for information or documents to be provided on a voluntary basis.[9] The scope of these requests, including the relevant time period and type of information to be submitted, is typically the subject of negotiation with congressional staff.[10] However, if those negotiations break down, or if a respondent is not authorized to produce documents unless legally compelled to do so, the committee chair may issue a subpoena.[11]
Congress can compel compliance with subpoenas by referring the matter to “the U.S. Attorney for prosecution of a criminal contempt of Congress charge,” detaining and prosecuting noncompliant individuals or entities “pursuant to Congress’s inherent contempt authority,” or initiating “a civil action to enforce [a] subpoena in a federal district court.”[14] The Department of Justice rarely pursues criminal contempt charges,[15] although there are a few recent examples limited to high‑ranking Executive Branch officials.[16] Civil suits to enforce subpoenas are similarly rare and generally limited to high-ranking Executive Branch officials.[17] Congress has not used “the inherent contempt process . . . since 1935,”[18] although several Members of Congress have threatened to do so.[19] In addition to potential legal risks, subjects of congressional investigations must also manage the reputational and market risks that can arise from the public nature of these inquiries.
Recent letters from congressional Democrats to industry executives and government agencies[20] suggest several potential investigative priorities.
The scope of congressional Democrats’ likely investigative agenda suggests that companies operating in the following industry sectors, among others, could be the subject of congressional scrutiny:
Although congressional Democrats have sent letters to specific companies in the aforementioned industries seeking information and often instructing respondents to preserve documents, investigative priorities are dynamic and may shift as the country heads closer to the midterms.
[1] See, e.g., Quinnipiac University, Trump’s Handling of Economy Hits All-Time Low, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds (May 20, 2026) (“If the election were held today, 50 percent of voters would want to see the Democratic Party win control of the United States House of Representatives, while 39 percent would want to see the Republican Party win control of the House.”); see also Katie Glueck, et al., Democrats’ Midterm Strength Masks Fierce Divides and Frustration, Poll Shows, N.Y. Times (May 21, 2026) (“Democrats appear well positioned to take the House and compete for the Senate in November.”).
[2] See generally Douglas Kriner & Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and Congressional Investigations, 33 Legis. Stud. Q. 295, 298 (2008) (describing how “divided partisan control of the branches . . . increase[s] congressional investigatory activity”); see also Molly E. Reynolds & Jackson Gode, Divided Government, Disruptive President: Congressional Oversight of the Executive Branch in the 116th Congress, Brookings, July 19, 2021, at 2 (noting that data show that “between 1898 and 2014, when one party controlled the House and the other the presidency, House committees investigated the executive branch more aggressively”).
[3] Jason A. MacDonald & Robert J. McGrath, Retrospective Congressional Oversight and the Dynamics of Legislative Influence over the Bureaucracy, 41 Legis. Stud. Q. 899, 902 (2016).
[4] Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848, 862 (2020) (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927)).
[5] Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
[6] McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174.
[7] Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
[8] Mazars, 591 U.S. at 863 (citing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955)).
[9] See Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual 42–43 (2026) (“[C]ommittees generally seek to obtain voluntary compliance with their requests for documents, testimony, and other information.”).
[11] See id. (“[W]hen Congress finds an inquiry blocked by the withholding of information, or where the traditional process of negotiation . . . [is] unavailing, a subpoena—for either testimony or documents—may be used to compel compliance with congressional demands.”).
[12] See, e.g., H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 119th Cong., Rules of the Committee on Energy and Commerce Rule XVI (“The power to authorize and issue subpoenas is delegated to the chair of the full Committee.”) (2025).
[13] See, e.g., Letter from Brad Karp to Gary Cohen (Dec. 14, 2010) (objecting to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s then-forthcoming publication of Citigroup documents and recordings of witness interviews containing “highly confidential non-public information” despite the Commission’s “repeated[] assur[ances]” that it would use the materials “solely to aid” it “in drafting its report”).
[14] Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 75 (D.D.C. 2008).
[15] Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB10974, Criminal Contempt of Congress: Frequently Asked Questions 3 (2023) (“Although 2 U.S.C. § 194 explicitly states that it ‘shall be the duty’ of the U.S. Attorney to present an approved contempt citation to a grand jury, DOJ has not interpreted the statute as creating a mandatory duty, asserting instead that it retains discretion over any individual contempt referral from Congress. Since 2008, the House has held ten individuals in criminal contempt of Congress. Of those referrals, the DOJ sought the indictment of two.”).
[16] See United States v. Navarro, 651 F. Supp. 3d 212, 221 (D.D.C. 2023) (denying former White House advisor Peter K. Navarro’s motion to dismiss indictment on “two counts of Contempt of Congress in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192”); see also Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform Oversight Committee Republicans and Democrats Hold Bill and Hillary Clinton in Contempt for Defying Lawful Subpoenas (Jan. 21, 2026) (noting that the House Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform voted to recommend the prosecution of former President Bill Clinton and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton).
[17] See, e.g., Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss action brought by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to enforce subpoena it had issued against him); see also Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (finding that the House Judiciary Committee, which initiated a civil suit pursuant to a resolution of the House of Representatives, had “Article III standing to seek enforcement” of subpoena it had issued against White House Counsel).
[18] Todd Garvey, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34097, Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure 12 (2017).
[19] See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Anna Paulina Luna to the U.S. House of Representatives (June 24, 2024) (calling for Congress to “use[] its inherent contempt powers and instruct[] the Sergeant at Arms to bring Attorney General [Merrick] Garland to the House for questioning and compel him to produce [ ] requested evidence”); see also Andrea Hsu, Lawmakers Threaten Attorney General Bondi with Contempt over Incomplete Epstein Files, NPR (Dec. 21, 2025) (citing statement from Rep. Thomas Massie that he and Rep. Ro Khanna discussed “bring[ing] inherent contempt against [former Attorney General] Pam Bondi”).
[20] See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA) to Zach Witkoff, Co-Founder of World Liberty Financial Inc. (Feb. 4, 2026); see also Letter from Reps. Robert Garcia (D-CA), Rick Larsen (D‑WA), and Bennie Thompson (D-MS) to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 18, 2026).
[21] Justin Papp, Prediction Market Bets on Sports, Election, War Would Be Verboten Under New Legislation, CNBC (Mar. 26, 2026).
[22] See S. Res. 708, 119th Cong. (2026).
[23] See Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), X (Mar. 23, 2026, at 5:10 ET), https://x.com/AOC/status/2036188830735204572 (commenting that Kalshi’s purported plans to prohibit athletes and politicians from trading on their markets was “absolutely not enough . . . [w]e need to do more”).
[24] Ben Protess, et al., The S.E.C. Was Tough on Crypto. It Pulled Back After Trump Returned to Office, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14, 2025).
[25] Letter from Reps. Maxine Waters (D-CA), Brad Sherman (D-CA), and Sean Casten (D-IL) to SEC Chairman Paul Atkins (Jan. 15, 2026).
[26] See Justin Papp, House Democrats Call for Treasury Probe into Trump Family Crypto Venture, CNBC (Feb. 19, 2026) (citing Letter from Reps. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) and Nydia Velázquez (D-NY), et al. to Secretary Scott Bessent (Feb. 19, 2026), which “call[ed] for an investigation of possible conflicts of interest and national security concerns related to World Liberty Financial, the Trump Family’s cryptocurrency venture”); see also Press Release, Rep. Ro Khanna (D‑CA), Ranking Member Ro Khanna Presses World Liberty Financial for Information on Trump Family Crypto Corruption (Feb. 4, 2026).
[27] Matt Egan, Democratic Senators Sound the Alarm on Pentagon Backing Firms Linked to Donald Trump Jr., CNN (Jan. 23, 2026).
[28] See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS), The Ultimate Grift: How DHS Is Enriching the President and His Allies at Taxpayer Expense (Mar. 25, 2026).
[29] Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) to Orice Williams Brown (May 20, 2026).
[30] Press Release, Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ), Pallone Launches Surveillance Pricing Inquiry (May 13, 2026); Letter from Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ) to Costco, et al. (May 11, 2026).
[31] Ankush Khardori, “The DOJ Cannot Be Trusted”: A Top Democrat Unloads on the Epstein Files Saga, POLITICO (Feb. 5, 2026).
[32] Letter from Reps. Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA) and Bobby Scott (D-VA) to The Honorable Daniel Aronowitz (Apr. 15, 2026).
[33] See Letter from Reps. Frank Pallone (D-NJ), Bobby Scott (D-VA), and Richard Neal (D-MA), and Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) to Robert M. Davis (Apr. 13, 2026) (demanding information about the Merck & Co., Inc. agreement with the Trump administration, which “was heralded by the White House as an achievement to lower drug prices,” though it “appears to be a financial win for the Trump family”).
[34] Letter from Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) to Andrew R. Jassy(Dec. 15, 2025).
[35] Letter from Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), and Ron Wyden (D-OR) to The Honorable Russell Vought (Nov. 19, 2025).