On July 15, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System that the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. abrogated the Second Circuit’s longstanding test for establishing a prima facie Title VII religious-accommodation claim.
Under the Second Circuit’s prior test, a plaintiff was required to show that the plaintiff had a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement, informed the employer of that belief, and was disciplined for failing to comply with the requirement. Under Bergin, a plaintiff must instead show that the plaintiff actually required an accommodation of a religious practice and that the employer’s desire to avoid that prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. The decision therefore shifts the focus from whether the employer received notice of the need for an accommodation to whether avoiding an accommodation motivated the employer’s decision.
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The plaintiff in Bergin was a New York court officer who requested a religious exemption from her employer’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement. After her request was denied, she remained unvaccinated and was terminated. The district court granted partial summary judgment in her favor, applying the Second Circuit’s prior prima facie test.
The Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case. It held that Abercrombie’s motive-based standard applies not only to hiring decisions, the context in which Abercrombie arose, but also to terminations and other adverse employment decisions. Although an employer’s knowledge of an employee’s need for an accommodation may be evidence of motive, the absence of such evidence is not dispositive.
Bergin is a significant development for employers addressing religious-accommodation issues under Title VII. Employers should continue to apply their accommodation procedures consistently and contemporaneously document the basis for accommodation decisions.